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Well defined property rights, even if collective and without the 
alienation rights, should create an incentive for community 
members to guard against the encroachment by external 
intruders and to make investment in the resources (4). 
However, these de jure rights do not guarantee the 
conservation or sustainable use of the resources unless 
internal appropriation and management rules effectively 
regulate internal users (5). Whether a community can actually 
accomplish this task is an open question. 
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Over the last decade the Colombian Government has 
assigned collective land titles, more than 5 million hectares, 
to Afro communities along the Pacific Coast. A total of 157 
communities had received collective land titles in six 
departments of the country, benefiting more than 60.000 
families. This process differs from a traditional agrarian 
reform because the redistribution of land has not been 
oriented toward private individuals but to communities with 
historical presence in those territories. Thus, community 
members do not have access to individual property rights but 
to the collective titles assigned to each community. 
 
We examine the change in the property right regime in rural 
Afro Colombians Communities of the Pacific Coast. In 
particular, we explore the institutional and managerial 
developments that have occurred in the Afro communities of 
rural Buenaventura, Department of Valle del Cauca. We 
conduct an institutional analysis where we do not analyze the 
causes or evolution for the new property right regime but its 
consequences for the management of natural resources and 
the territory. 
  
In this context, the collective titles could be classified as pure 
common property regimes, in which only members have 
rights of entry, withdrawal and also full rights of management 
and exclusion of nonmembers (1). This is different from an 
open access regime, where due to the absence of well-
defined property rights, any person can potentially access 
and withdraw the resources (2). 
In our analysis we include Afro communities that have 
received collective titles and Afro communities that are 
currently applying for the title. We survey community leaders 
to understand if the communities have -- or have not -- 
evolved rules and procedures to manage the collective land 
after the change in the property right regime (Ley 70). We 
interviewed a total of 50 leaders from titled communities and 
24 leaders from non-titled communities. The titled 
communities in Buenaventura represent 18% of the total 
titled communities at the national level with almost 340,000 
hectares beneficiating more than 6.000 families. 
 
The collective titles in the Afro-Colombian communities 
include four of the five possible rights: access, withdrawal, 
management and exclusion (3). Afro-Colombian communities 
do not have the right of alienation, which implies that the 
collective titles cannot be sold or bought in the national land 
market. 
 
This paper illustrates how the collective titling has changed 
the region’s political landscape and the local environmental 
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governance in the Afro Colombian Communities. 
The formal collective title did not replace informal 
individual property rights (within the collective 
title) and those rights are still respected and 
supported by customary laws (e.g. the individual 
right of alienation for farm land).  Thus, the new 
system implies a complex regime in which 
different layers of property rights coexist within 
the new formal title.  
 
The formal property rights created the incentives 
and legal tools to guard against the 
encroachment by external intruders and 
promoted the definition of new rules and procedures to 
manage the resources. Here, we focus on the rules and 
procedures developed for the management of timer 
exploitation. 
 
In 64 % of titled communities both leaders claim that the 
Council Board has defined one or more rules to manage 
timber exploitation. The most common reported rules are size 
requirements, prohibition of particular species for 
commercialization, explicitly banned the exploitation done by 
outsiders or complete ban of timber exploitation done by any 
person -insider or outsider. A striking result is that non-titled 
communities have also defined new rules for timber 
exploitation. In 69% of non-titled communities both leaders 
claim that the Council Board has defined one or more rules to 
manage timber exploitation. Thus, not only the legal right (the 
title per se) but also the process of titling and more 
importantly the formation of the Community Council and 
Community Board have promoted new rules to manage the 
forest. 
 
The process of titling seems to have fostered a process of 
empowerment that, among other things, has brought to the 
attention of local leaders the importance of managing the 
territory. New rules have been also designed for other 
activities such as fishing, mollusk-harvesting, mining and 
hunting in both titled and not titled communities. However, 
the formalization of rules does not translate yet in a formal 
sanctioning and monitoring system. The consolidation of a 
local participatory government implies a social and cultural 
process based on empowerment, training and community 
organization that won’t occur immediately. The role of the 
external state environmental authority is crucial in this 
process and in order to succeed in the effort to decentralize 
natural resource management the joint management 
strategies need to be clarified (6). 
 
The role of external forces 
such armed groups and the 
expansion of illicit activities 
are also affecting the process 
of community building. 
Communities haven’t been 
able to control for the spread 
of illicit activities. Titled 
Communities have the legal 
instrument to fight the 
intrusion of legal companies 
with legal businesses. As a 
consequence of this, 
communities can now more easily exclude outsiders. 
However, a legal title is not enough to fight illegal activities 
that have other logics and means to drive their business. 
 
The design of new rules and procedures to manage the 
commons is an ongoing process. What we found today may 
rapidly change next year. Thus, the analysis of the effect of 
titling on the new institutions should also be a dynamic 
process. Our results are crucial to the understating of titling 
and should be taken as the benchmark or base line for future 
research. 
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